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PROCEDURAL STATUS OF THIS APPEAL
This appeal was assigned to the Utah Court of Appeals
for disposition by order of the Utah Supreme Court dated August
21, 1992.

This appeal is a consolidated appeal of two

previously separate appeals, Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Utah State
Tax Commission, Supreme Court No. 92-00012, and Amoco Oil
Company v. Utah State Tax Commission, Supreme Court No. 9200013.

By order of the Utah Supreme Court dated June 1, 1992,

these two appeals were consolidated into the current appeal now
before the Court of Appeals.
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ARGUMENT
I.
INTRODUCTION
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. ("Chevron") and Amoco Oil Company
("Amoco") are appealing the Utah State Tax Commission's central
assessment of 1989 property taxes against their respective Salt
Lake City refineries.

The Tax Commission held that the

refineries are appurtenant to the hundreds of oil wells that
supply them with crude oil, and therefore are subject to central
assessment under Utah Code Ann. §59-2-201(1)(d).

In 1989, that

statute provided:1
(1) By May 1 the following property shall be assessed
by the commission at 100% of fair market value, as valued on
January 1, in accordance with this chapter:
(c) all mines and mining claims...;
(d) all machinery used in mining, all property
or surface improvements upon or appurtenant to mines
or mining claims, and the value of any surface use
made of mining claims or mining property for other
than mining purposes. For the purposes of assessment
and taxation, all processing plants, mills, reduction
works, and smelters which are primarily used by the
1

The statute was amended in 1990 to add current sections (c)
and (d). Former §§ 59-2-201(1)(c) and (d) were redesignated § 592-201(e) and (f) respectively, but remained substantively
unchanged. L. 1990, ch. 41, § 2. All citations are to the statute
as it existed in 1989.
-1-

owner of a mine or mining claim for processing,
reducing, or smelting minerals taken from a mine or
mining claim, shall be considered appurtenant to that
mine or mining claim, regardless of actual
location..,. (Emphasis added).
The Tax Commission held that the refineries were in
fact surface improvements appurtenant to "mines" (i.e. oil
wells) on the basis of the Utah Supreme Court's discussion of
appurtenances in Amax Magnesium Corp. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n,
796 P. 2d 1256 (Utah 1990).2

Chevron and Amoco contend that

the Amax decision is factually far different from the current
situation, and that the Tax Commission's interpretation of the
statutory term "appurtenant" is not in accordance with the
accepted meaning of the term, requiring reversal of the Tax
Commission's decision.
Although the Tax Commission decision did not rely upon
the second sentence of § 59-2-201(1)(d), the Tax Commission and
respondents Salt Lake and Davis Counties (the "Counties") now
fall back upon this provision, arguing that it constitutes the
Utah legislature's intended definition of the term
"appurtenant•••

The Respondents argue in their briefs that,

2

Chevron R. 9; Amoco R. 9. Because the Amoco and Chevron
proceedings were not consolidated until they reached the Supreme
Court, two separate records exist in this appeal- Citations are to
the individual records.
-2-

because more than 50% of the refinery feedstocks used by Chevron
and Amoco were composed of oil produced from their affiliated
companies' interests in various oil wells, the refineries must
be deemed appurtenant to those wells.

The respondents' argument

stretches the statute far beyond its clear language, which by
its terms includes only processing plants associated with a
particular mine, not hundreds of scattered oil wells that
individually supply only tiny fractions of the refineries'
feedstocks.
Chevron and Amoco contend that even if their
refineries could be centrally assessed under § 59-2-201, the Tax
Commission erred in not extending them the 20% deduction for
intangible expenses formerly provided for locally-assessed
property by Utah Code Ann, § 59-2-304 (repealed).

Failure to

give Chevron and Amoco the 20% deduction for intangible expenses
while maintaining the deduction for locally-assessed refineries
results in unconstitutional non-uniformity and inequality of
assessment between virtually identical properties, and
prejudices them with regard to their competitors.
Contrary to the arguments of the Tax Commission and
the Counties, the record in this proceeding reflects substantial
evidence of the two necessary elements of this claim.
-3-

First,

the record reflects that the Tax Commission's central assessment
of the refineries used an assessment method identical to that
used by the counties.

Second, the record shows that the Tax

Commission's failure to give Chevron and Amoco the 20% valuation
discount then available to locally-assessed petroleum refineries
caused them competitive harm vis a vis their locally-assessed
competitors.

Under these circumstances, the Tax Commission was

constitutionally required to grant them the 20% discount under
the Supreme Court's decision in Amax Magnesium Corp. v. Utah
State Tax Comm'n, 796 P. 2d 1256 (Utah 1990).

II.
THE REFINERIES CANNOT BE DEEMED APPURTENANT
TO MULTIPLE WELLS

The Tax Commission held that the Chevron and Amoco
refineries were actually appurtenant to the hundreds of wells
producing oil used by them, based upon the Utah Supreme Court's
discussion of the appurtenance issue in Amax Magnesium Corp. v.
Utah State Tax Commission, supra.3

In ruling as it did, the

Tax Commission disregarded the generally accepted definition of

3

Chevron R. 9; Amoco R. 9.
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an appurtenance as something that is an incident to a principal
property, necessarily connected with the use and enjoyment of
the principal, and that passes with a conveyance of the
principal.

Black's Law Dictionary 94 (5th Ed. 1979); Utah Code

Ann. § 57-1-12.
Both Chevron and Amoco presented uncontested evidence
at the formal hearing establishing a number of important facts:
(1) no single well or field, of the hundreds involved, supplied
the majority of feedstock used by either refinery* and most
supplied only tiny fractions of the oil used by the refineries;
(2) the refineries were owned and operated by separate divisions
(in Chevron's case) or corporations (in Amoco's case) from the
entities owning the oil produced from the subject wells; (3) the
companies generally did not own entire oil wells, but rather
owned fractional working interests in the wells, which were
often operated by third parties; (4) the refineries received oil
by truck and pipelines operated by unrelated entities as well as
by pipelines operated by the companies' affiliates; and (5) the
refineries and wells were capable of profitable operation
without reference to each other, and were in fact operated
independently.

As more fully set forth in Chevron and Amoco's

principal briefs, these facts are incompatible with a finding of
-5-

appurtenance under the Amax court's discussion of appurtenance
or otherwise.
Faced with undisputed evidence that the refineries
were not appurtenant to the wells under the normal
interpretation of that term, the Tax Commission and the Counties
fall back upon the second sentence of Utah Code Ann. § 59-2201(1)(d).

This provision does not support the Tax Commission's

decision in favor of central assessment.

The second sentence of

Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-201(1)(d) by its terms applies only when a
processing plant is primarily used by the owner of a, mine to
process materials from the mine.4

More importantly, the

processing plant is then considered appurtenant to that mine.
The Respondents claim that this language permits the refineries
to be considered appurtenant to hundreds of individual wells in
three states.

The statute in fact makes no provision for a

plant being appurtenant to multiple mines.

The statute's

literal terms exclude its application to Chevron and Amoco.
A

There was undisputed evidence at the formal hearing that
Amoco Oil Company, the owner of the Amoco refinery, did not own the
"Amoco" wells in question, which were owned and operated by a
separate corporation, Amoco Production Company. In Chevron's case,
the wells were owned and operated by an entirely separate division
of Chevron U.S.A. Inc. Because the second sentence of § 59-2201(d) requires common ownership of the mine and plant, this fact
provides an alternative basis for a decision against central
assessment.
-6-

The Respondents argue the Court of Appeals should
disregard the Utah legislature's use of the singular in the
second sentence of § 59-2-201(d), because the first sentence of
that section states that surface improvements appurtenant to
"mines" are to be centrally assessed.
inconsistent.

The two uses are not

As a general matter, surface improvements

appurtenant to mines are centrally assessed.

Where a particular

facility primarily processes minerals from a single mine;
however, it can be considered appurtenant only to that mine even
if not otherwise appurtenant.

The legislature's use of the

plural to state a general rule, and the singular in a specific
situation, is completely consistent, and does not prevent the
statute from being construed as a whole.

The Court must assume

in this situation that the legislature used this language
advisedly, and interpret the statute in accordance with its
literal terms.

Savage Industries, Inc. v. Utah State Tax

Commission, 811 P. 2d 664 (Utah 1991). Interpretation of tax
statutes is a question of law, and the reviewing court need give
no deference to the Tax Commission's interpretations. ,Id; see
also Oaden Union Rv. Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 395 P. 2d 57 (Utah
1964)(ambiguous statutes to be construed against taxing
authority).
-7-

The Respondents also err in their contention that
the second sentence of § 59-2-201(1)(d) contains the legislative
definition of "appurtenant."

The Respondents argue that this

"definition" indicates a legislative intent that the common law
meaning of "appurtenant" not apply.

The second sentence of this

section is not a definition, but rather an alternative ground
for central assessment.
in two circumstances.

The statute allows central assessment

The first circumstance is when a surface

improvement actually is appurtenant to a mine.

Alternatively,

under the second sentence of § 59-2-201(1)(d), when a processing
plant is used primarily in connection with a mine, it is
statutorily considered appurtenant to that mine.

Even were the

second sentence of § 59-2-201(1)(d) applicable here, it does not
evidence legislative intent to broaden the definition of
appurtenance.
The respondents' arguments have a number of other
problems.

The Tax Commission argues that a refinery can be

appurtenant to hundreds of separate fractional interests in
various wells.

However, the legislature's use of the singular

in the second sentence of § 59-2-201(1)(d) reflects a basic
principle of property law —

that an appurtenance, because of

its subordinate nature, can be appurtenant to only one other
-8-

property.

This principle was recognized by the Utah legislature

in Utah Code Ann, § 57-1-12, which provides that an appurtenance
passes with a conveyance of the principal property, even if not
listed in the conveyance.

In this case, sales of individual

wells and fields (to which the refineries are ostensibly
appurtenant) are made regularly, obviously without a concurrent
transfer of the refineries.

The Tax Commission has attempted to

stretch the statute to fit a situation to which it was not
intended.

If the statute is truly construed as a whole, as it

should be, then it is clear that the refineries cannot be
considered appurtenant to the wells in question.
III.
THE CHEVRON REFINERY IS NOT SUBJECT TO
CENTRAL ASSESSMENT UNDER UTAH CODE ANN, S
59-2-201(1)(A).
The respondents argue that Utah Code Ann. § 59-2201(1)(a) permits central assessment of Chevron's refinery.
This section provides for central assessment of:
(a) all property which operates as a unit
across county lines, if the values must be
apportioned among more than one county or
Sudu6

....

The respondents assert that, because a small portion
of the Chevron refinery property overlaps the Salt Lake County
-9-

line, this section applies, without further analysis of whether
the statutory conditions for central assessment have been met.
The record reflects that the portions of the Chevron
refinery lying in Salt Lake County - a driveway and the visitor
parking strip - were separately assessed by Salt Lake County for
years prior to 1989.5

In applying § 59-2-201(1)(a) for 1989,

the Tax Commission failed to make any finding that the values
must be apportioned among more than one county. Chevron R. 7-8.
The statute requires this element before central assessment is
proper.
The term "apportionment" in tax statutes implies more
than simply determining the value of property in a given
geographic area;

apportionment is instead the process of

dividing an indivisible unit value among geographic areas.
Southern Pacific Trans. Co. v. Department of Revenue, 732 P. 2d
18, 23 (Oregon 1987). In Chevron's situation, there is no need
for apportionment of values among more than one county.

The

portion of the property in Salt Lake County is a discrete parcel
which had easily been assessed by the Salt Lake County Assessor

5

As Chevron
central assessment
any time prior to
Redetermination of

noted in its principal brief, this basis for
was never raised by the Property Tax Division at
the formal hearing of Chevron's Petition for
the 1989 assessment. Chevron T. 9-13.
-10-

for years.

This is not the factual circumstance for which the

statute was intended - an indivisible operation such as a
railroad or pipeline, for which local assessments of an
indivisible whole are impractical. Southern Pacific, supra.

No

apportionment of values is necessary because the parcels in each
county can be assessed individually.

Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-

201(1)(a) does not apply.

IV.
SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE EXISTS IN THE RECORD TO
OVERTURN THE TAX COMMISSION'S DECISION NOT
TO GRANT THE REFINERIES THE STATUTORY 20%
DISCOUNT FOR LOCALLY-ASSESSED PROPERTIES.

In 1989, locally assessed property within the state of
Utah received a 20% discount on assessed valuation for
intangible expenses incurred in the sale of such property.

Utah

Code Ann. Section 59-2-304 (1989 Supp.)(repealed). Centrallyassessed properties did not receive this discount. The evidence
at the Tax Commission's formal hearings showed that central
assessment caused Chevron and Amoco to bear a higher property
tax burden than their locally assessed competitors, with
resultant competitive damage.

Chevron and Amoco contend that

the Tax Commission's failure to grant them the 20% discount
-11-

violated Utah's statutory and constitutional requirements of
uniform taxation. Utah Const., Article XIII, § 3(1); Utah Code
Ann. Section 59-2-103 (1989 Supp.)
After the Tax Commission's formal hearing in this
matter, the Utah Supreme Court required the Tax Commission to
give a centrally-assessed taxpayer the 20% discount where local
and central assessment methods were similar.

Amax Magnesium

Corp. v. Utah State Tax Commission, 796 P. 2d 1256 (Utah 1990).
The respondents seek to distinguish Amax from this case by
contending that Chevron and Amoco presented insufficient
evidence on the issue of uniformity.
Both respondents quote language from Amax in their
briefs, listing requirements set forth by the Utah Supreme Court
in a prior decision, Rio Alqom Corp. v. San Juan County, 681 P.
2d 184, 192 (Utah 1984).

The respondents claim that Chevron and

Amoco did not present sufficient evidence concerning these
requirements.

However, the respondents fail to note that the

Amax court, in the next paragraph, specifically distinguished
these requirements where it was shown that similar valuation
methods were used by both the state and county assessors. 796 P.
2d at 1260.

The Supreme Court went on to state:

It strains reason to assert that if
assessors using the cost and market
-12-

appraisal methods overvalue county
properties, the same overvaluation would not
occur with state properties assessed by the
same methods. Assuming that the legislature
was correct in determining that the market
value appraisal method overvalues property
by 20 percent, it would be unconstitutional
to apply [the 20% discount] to countyassessed properties and not to stateassessed properties, 796 P. 2d at 1260.
Under Amax, all Amoco and Chevron need to show to
prove an unconstitutional lack of uniformity between their
centrally-assessed refineries and locally-assessed refineries is
that the Tax Commission used the same assessment methods in the
central assessment as those used by the Counties.

The

appellants did so, providing testimony that both the County
Assessors and the Tax Commission used the same depreciated cost
valuation method. Chevron T. 17; Amoco T. 11; Supplemental
Record. In fact, as the Tax Commission was aware, the Tax
Commission had used the affidavits of valuation submitted by
Chevron and Amoco for 1989 to the County Assessors for the
central assessment.

In other words, not only were the

assessment methods the same, but the Tax Commission and the
County actually used the same assessments. Chevron T. 17;
Supplemental Record. The companies met their burden of proof
under Amax to show non-uniformity of taxation between their own
centrally-assessed refineries and their locally-assessed
-13-

competitors.
The respondents also seek to divert the court's
attention by arguing that Chevron and Amoco were classed
separately from locally-assessed refineries because they used
primarily their own oil, and that there was uniform treatment
within that class of refineries.

This argument fails because

the Tax Commission reached the same conclusion as to value for
the refineries under central assessment as that reached by the
Counties under local assessment, because it used the same
appraisal methods.

The difference in taxation resulted solely

from its failure to apply Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-304 (1989
Supp.)(repealed) to those identical values.

The Tax Commission

cannot credibly assert that the Chevron and Amoco refineries
should be classified separately from, and valued more highly
than their locally-assessed competitors, when it has reached the
same conclusions of underlying value for both centrally and
locally assessed properties.
CONCLUSION
The Tax Commission seeks to tax Chevron and Amoco at a
higher rate than locally-assessed refineries in direct
competition with them.

There is no statutory basis here for

central assessment of either refinery.
-14-

Even if there were,

central assessment results in an unconstitutional non-uniformity
of taxation.

Chevron and Amoco are entitled to a level playing

field with their competitors.

The Tax Commission's decision

should be reversed.
DATED this

>f

day of August, 1992.
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